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Cadres and Managers. 
Changing Patterns of Recruitment 
of Economic Leaders in a Planned Economy 
György Lengyel∗ 
Abstract: This paper is about the criteria of selection of 
leaders of the Hungarian – and some other East European – 
planned economies. It deals with the connections of these 
criteria with education and career patterns. It interprets the 
changes in terms of professionalization and cadrification. It 
argues that because this processes are interwoven the em-
phasis between loyalty and education (or to put it in the 
immanent terminology of personnel policy: among the cate-
gories of political responsibility, professional knowledge 
and the skills of leadership) has been slightly altered during 
the decades of state socialism. But behind the balance of 
loyalty and competence those social variables which were 
seriously taken into account in the personnel policy have 
been changed frequently and sometimes dramatically. It is in-
tended to disclose that despite the basic similarities of social-
ist industrialization there were differences among the Eastern 
European societies, concerning the pace of cadre changes 
and the social-educational composition of the economic el-
ites. It also suggests that one has to distinguish two levels of 
economic leadership from the very beginning of nationali-
zation. In the light of empirical evidence the criteria of re-
cruitment in the case of the planners-controllers and in the 
case of the enterprise managers were different. 
According to the Hungarian experiences the economic re-
form supported the process of professionalization, although 
the proportion of party members remained extremely high. 
With the systemic changes party membership lost and net-
works gained importance in the selection of the elite. 
                                                             
∗  Adress all communications to: György Lengyel, Department of Sociology and Social 
Policy, Fővám tér 8, Budapest, 1093, Hungary, E-Mail: gyorgy.lengyel@uni-corvinus.hu. 
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Despite the importance of the subject literature on leaders in 
planned economies is rather scanty. A greater part of arti-
cles are managerial studies, while empirical contributions 
mainly survey the political elites1 rather than the leaders in-
volved in the economic control sphere and at the helm of 
enterprises, a layer which is more difficult to reconstruct 
empirically2. 
It is a specific feature of research on Hungarian leaders to 
use case studies or interviews.3 These methods, though most 
suitable for exploring the attitudes and interests of leader, 
mark out the boundaries of analysis as well. The data and 
information in the following represent mostly the Hungar-
ian, and partly the Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovakian de-
velopments. 
Changing Criteria of Selection 
Although the selection of cadres has been treated as a confidential issue for 
decades, there have always been studies throwing light on certain sociological 
                                                             
1  R. B. Farrel (ed.) Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Chicago, 
1970.; S. Bialer: Succesion and Turnover of Soviet Elites. Journal of International Affairs. 
Vol. 32. No. 2. 1978. pp.181-200.; J. Bielasiak: Lateral and Vertical Elite Differentiation in 
European Communist States. Studies in Comparative Communism. Vol. XI. Nos. 1-2. 
1978. pp. 121-141.; W. A. Welsh: Leaders and Elites. N.Y. etc. 1979. pp. 122-141.; P. S. 
Shoup: The East European and Soviet Data Handbook: Political, Social and Developmental 
Indicators, 1945-1975. N.Y. 1981. 
2  There are works in this field which highlight changes in the structure and education with 
quantitative analyses: K. E. Bailes: Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin. Origins 
of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1917-1941., Princeton, N. J. 1978.; S. Fitzpatrick: 
Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934. Cambridge etc. 1979.; D. 
Granick: Management in the Industrial Firm in the USSR N.Y. 1954.; A. H. Barton-B. De-
nitch-C. Kadushin (eds.): Opinion-Making Elites in Yugoslavia. N.Y. 1973. Comparative 
data are provided by D. Granick: Enterprise Guidance in Eastern Europe. A Comparison of 
Four Socialist Economies. Princeton, N.J. 1975.; idem: The Red Executive. A Study of the 
Organizational Man in Russian Industry. N.Y. 1961. 
3  See among others: István Kemény: Vállalati vezetés és vállalati vezetök Magyarországon. 
(Enterprise management and enterprise managers in Hungary) Manuscript, (no date); Lajos 
Héthy-Csaba Makó: Vezetés, vezetökiválasztás, ösztönzés. (Management, recruitment of 
leaders, incentives) Bp. 1979.; Tamás Bauer-Mihály Laki: Vállalatvezetés, profilváltozás 
(Enterprise guidance, profile change) Valóság 1972. No. 10. pp. 50-59.; Zsuzsa Hegedüs-
Márton Tardos: A vállalati vezetök helyzetének és motivációjának néhány problémája. 
(Some problems of the position and motivation of enterprise managers) Közgazdasági 
Szemle (KGSZ) l974. No. 2. pp. 162-173.; Teréz Laky: Kötödés a vállalathoz (Attachment 
to the firm) Valóság 1976. No. 12. pp. 52-61.; Ferenc Nemes: A vezetöi szerepfelfogás és 
magatartás néhány problémája vállalatainknál. (Some problems of interpreting the role of 
manager and managerial behavior in our firms) KGSZ 1981. Nos. 7-8. pp. 797-806. 
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aspects of the phenomenon. One was A. F. Havin’s paper4, who used figures 
published in the 1930’s5 and his own contemporary researches and interviews 
in an effort to define the patterns of selecting and training Soviet heavy indus-
try leaders, covering a sizeable stratum of the economy in the first five-year 
plans. His quantitative analysis reveals some regularities and some general 
trends of the early phase of planned economy such as considerable fluctuation 
among leaders, the predominance of worker-cadres and party members, an 
increased level of higher education combined with new institutional forms of 
training especially in engineering. His portraits of managers expose the peculi-
arities of campaigns reflected in the careers and the convertibility of political 
and economic leadership positions.6 
Before 1945 the traditional economic elite in Eastern Europe was a closed 
social formation. The overwhelming majority of the elite originated from upper 
and upper middle class families and had higher education. The most important 
– informal but at the same time very effective – criteria of the traditional mode 
of selection were ownership, class origin and higher education.  
However, compared with previous generations of the economic elite, the 
economic leaders of the inter-war period showed clear signs of professionaliza-
tion. The role of higher education had been strengthened in the selection proc-
ess while wealth and class origin carried less weight. Technical and economic 
higher education also expanded and the type of the “company-manager” began 
to spread. Indirectly the growing role of education and experience has been 
signified by the fact that the average age of the future leaders in entry level 
positions and later in managerial positions has increased significantly. These 
features characterized both the leaders of private enterprises and the leaders and 
experts of economic policy, whose importance begun to increase during the 30s. 
In the course of nationalization between 1945 and 1949 strategic decision-
making concerning productive units was taken away from the enterprises which 
resulted in a schism between the above mentioned two spheres of the institu-
tional system. One specific feature of this split structure was that the social 
composition of the leaders of enterprises and that of planning and control insti-
tutions became significantly different. While in enterprises the criteria of loy-
alty were preponderant in selection after the nationalization – certain figures 
suggest that nearly two-thirds of the newly appointed Hungarian managers had 
an educational level of six elementary grades or less7 –, in the economic control 
                                                             
4  A. F. Havin: Kapitani sovietskoi industrii 1926-1940 godi. (Captains of Soviet industry, 
1926-1940). Voprosi istorii. 1966. No. 3. pp. 3-14. 
5  Novie kadri tiazheloi promishlennosti. (New cadres of heavy industry) Moscow 1934.; 
Kadri tiazheloi promishlennosti v tsifrah. (Cadres of heavy industry in numbers) Moscow 
1936. 
6  György Lengyel: The recruitment and level of education of the Hungarian business elite in 
the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, in: Rudolf Andorka-Laszlo Bertalan (eds.), 
Economy and Society in Hungary. Bp. l986, pp. 117-138. 
7  Az ötéves terv szakmai kádereiröl. (On the professional cadres of the five-year plan) Sza-
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sphere loyalty and professional competence were equally considered for eligi-
bility. A telling sign of this is that although the overwhelming majority – nearly 
four-fifths – of leaders in the control sphere were members of the Hungarian 
Workers Party, 45% of them were members of the intelligence and another 
22% had a background as white collar workers.8 
Some one-fourth of the control sphere leaders of 1949 had been in the civil 
service before 1945. The relatively high rate of careers continued after 1945 
indicates that despite the fundamental restructuring, professional competence 
retained its comparatively great weight in the control sphere which produced a 
specific type of career in the public service. 
The distribution at the time of entering into the civil service clearly reflects 
the recruitment strategy of central economic management. While 70% of those 
who were in the public service before 1945, originally had some intellectual 
occupation, their rate kept decreasing year by year among the newly appointed 
leaders to a level as low as one-fourth in 1949. The rate of those rising from 
worker status, including a considerable proportion of clerical workers to man-
ager status was extremely dynamic. The peasantry, however, was practically 
left out of these processes: the proportion of manager-turned-peasants did not 
come up to 1%. On the other hand the proportion of peasant politicians within 
the Parliament in 1947-49 was 32.9% 9. This fact gains its proper weight if we 
consider that in 1949 half of the active population worked in the agriculture. 
As far as class origin is concerned the cadre statistics are less reliable be-
cause the questionnaires were filled out by the leaders and the distortion was in 
their own interest. The working-class origin will therefore be overrepresented – 
although, owing to the strict external controls not extremely. Nevertheless the 
data are useable, if we keep in mind that they throw light on the ideological 
preferences of the period rather than the real social background.  
Those of working-class origin among the leaders of the control sphere had 
an average one-third share in the second half of the 40s with a high growth rate, 
so that in 1949 half of the new appointees came from blue-collar working-class 
families. A further fourth of leaders originated from clerical worker families. 
                                                                                                                                
bad Nép (Sz.N.) January 25, 1949, p. 5. The press documents are reviewed in: Tamás, 
Fábián: Az ipar új tisztikara 1948-1949-ben (The new top brass of industry in 1948-1949) 
(Dissertation, 1986). 
8   Source: Közalkalmazottak létszámkimutatása. (Statistics on the number of civil servants) 
Bp. 1950. Our sample includes the figures for heads of departments or higher ranking offi-
cials in the Council of Ministers, ministries of domestic trade, construction, agriculture, 
light industry, heavy industry, finance, post and telecommunication and foreign trade, the 
State Control Office, the Secretariat of the Economic Council and the National Planning 
Office. 
9  Data calculated on the basis of Bálint Szabó (ed.): A szocializmus útján. (Pursuing the 
course of socialism) Bp. 1982. pp. 572-573. It is illustrative of the political changes taking 
place during the two short periods that while in the first period small-holders had a 60% 
share among peasant politicians, in the second phase predominance went over to dwarf-
holders and the landless with 70%.  
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The principle of recruitment in the economic control sphere clearly favored the 
working-class and lower middle class origin. According to a 1950 survey of the 
light industries nearly half of the leaders of the ministries (from division’s 
heads to deputy department heads) came from working-class families and about 
one-fifth from clerical worker families10.  
These data reveal that in the early phase of planned economy social origin, 
which was previously an informal criterion of selection became a formal one; 
the preferences changed in time favoring those with intellectual background 
before 1945, those of clerical worker and middle-class origin in the coalition 
period (1944 – 1949) and those of a working-class and petty bourgeois origin 
later; loyalty was ascertained by social origin and political activity. 
In Czechoslovakia, after the communist group of February 1948, 44% of 
firm managers were replaced while the proportion of worker-managers attained 
only 30% in 1950. Lenka Kalinova concluded that an estimated 50% of the 
managerial stratum emerging after the cadre changes of the 1950s consisted of 
former workers.11 While the share of communist party members in the central 
offices of the economy was raised from 15% to 37% by February 1948, 35% of 
enterprise managers had already been members of the communist party be-
fore.12 This, and – in continuation of the political conditions of the inter-war 
period – the considerable share of loyal technical staff traditionally following 
left-wing orientations explains that the pace of cadre mobility was slower than 
elsewhere. Even so, a mere 10% of managers had higher education against 50% 
with only elementary training in 1957. This highlights the importance of re-
cruitment from strata with secondary professional education. 
In the mid-1950s more than four-fifths of the 200,000 enterprise managers 
in Poland were of worker and peasant origin.13 The proportion of managers 
with university diplomas plummeted from 84% in 1945 to 27% ten years later. 
From the end of the 50s, however, the level of education grew continuously 
both among managers and their deputies. While the rate of managers and chief 
engineers with college degree surpassed 50 and 70% respectively by 1968, it 
was about 36% among administrative and economic deputy managers and a 
mere 16% among head accountants. In the early 70s university graduates made 
up some 70% of enterprise managers and 90% of department heads in minis-
tries. 
                                                             
10  HSWP CC Institute of Party History Archives. 276f. 90/193. pp. 41-55. 
11  Lenka Kalinova: Az irányitási apparátus összetételében február után lezajlott változásokhoz 
(On the February changes in the composition of the apparatus of guidance) in: Bálint Mag-
yar (ed.): Tanulmányok és dokumentumok a második világháború utáni csehszlovák társa-
dalmi és hatalmi struktúra témaköréböl. (Studies and documents on the post-World War II. 
structure of Czechoslovak society and power) Manuscript, 1980. V. p. 22. 
12  Idem: A müszaki-gazdasági apparátus szakképzettségének és strukturájának alakulása. (Changes 
in the professional education and structure of the technical economic apparatus.) ibid. VI.pp.2-3. 
13  Marian J.Kostecki: The managerial cadres of the Polish industry: research report. The 
Polish Sociological Bulletin, No. 2. 1977. pp. 85-96. 
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In Hungary the contemporary leading party paper, Szabad Nép (Free Peo-
ple) from the very beginning depicted the image of the new type of leader both 
as a demand (“Put workers at the head of the nationalized factories!”) and as 
reality (“Typist-turned-ministerial commissar”; “Director from ex-iron turner, 
engine fitter, baker”).14 Both lines of the positive representation of the new 
managerial type, the normative and the idealizing, ran all through the coalition 
period. Significantly, it reported almost exclusively on enterprises, leaving the 
sphere of economic control unmentioned. The other branch of writings, that of 
criticism, discussed the traditional stratum of leaders. They equally addressed 
the enterprises and the control institutions (“Members of counter-revolutionary 
societies high in the ministry in finance”; “Sneaking reactionaries into the lead-
ership of cooperatives under the pretext of competence”; “Bank directors earn-
ing thousands for nothing”), and the tone grew ever harsher after 1947 
(“MAVAG general director ex-conspirator”; “István Varga must go”; “Bribery, 
sabotage, industrial espionage around Ferrotechnika”; “Heads of Gamma fac-
tory contracted with smugglers”; “The devil take the hindmost”)15. The tradi-
tional experts, especially those of engineering, were described in an ambivalent 
tone. On the one hand, it was declared back in 1945 that the hostile attitude to 
leaders must be changed and distrust between engineers and skilled workers 
must be eliminated, and on the other, examples were enumerated to warn the 
worker-directors to be cautious and keep an eye on the old-time technical engi-
neers’ intent to sabotage. They stressed the topicality of Stalin’s statement, 
that: “the most highly qualified segment of the old-time technical experts was 
poisoned by the germ of destruction.”16 The article entitled “Competence and 
sabotage” complained that there were factories which accepted “reactionaries” 
as irreplaceable, enabling such figures to rise to leading positions.17 The behav-
ior of the leader was characterized by vigilance and by the concept of “ser-
vice”, indicating a new type of puritanism, that of the functionary, stressed in 
managerial portraits, memoirs and retrospective interviews. 
In the economic ideology18 service and vigilance appeared in the inconsis-
tent duality of the leaders’ attitude towards the idealized class and his immedi-
ate subordinates. 
The first half of the 50s saw massive cadre mobility. Young experts entered 
the economic control sphere in considerable numbers. In 1953, for instance, 
nearly half of the recent college graduates in economics took jobs in ministries 
and government agencies19. As is known from a subsequent party resolution, 
                                                             
14  Sz. N. Dec. 15., 1946. p. 3.; Oct. 28., 1945. p. 2.; Dec. 25., 1946. p. 8. 
15  Sz. N. Jun. 7., 1946. p. 3.; Jun. 12., 1946. p. 3.; Febr. 9., 1947. p. 9.; Apr. 15., 1948. p.5. 
16  J.V.Sztálin: A gazdasági vezetök feladatairól. Uj helyzet-uj feladatok a gazdasági 
épitömunkában. (On the duties of economic leaders. New situation - new tasks in the eco-
nomic development) Bp. 1949. p. 33. 
17  Sz. N. Oct. 3., 1948. p. 13. 
18  Sz. N. Oct. 31., 1948. p. 2.; Jan.15., 1949. p. 7.; Jan. 9., 1949. p. 9.; March 23., 1949. p. 7. 
19  Ildikó Hrubos: Közgazdász kohorszok pályafutásának összehasonlitása.Az ifjuságpolitika 
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40% of the managers of agricultural machine stations were replaced in a single 
year, and the chief engineers of coal mines remained in the same position for a 
year at most.20  
This is confirmed by a report of the Ministry of Metallurgy and Machine In-
dustry (MMMI) on the personnel policy in 1954, which emphasized as a posi-
tive feature that only 20.7% of managers had been relieved as against 33.7% in 
1953, and the fluctuation of one-fourth of chief engineers and chief accountants 
seemed to show an improving tendency. On cadre replacement the report con-
tended that “a part of them is healthy fluctuation due to the promotions of cad-
res, but the greater part is caused by inadequate cadre work and intolerance”.21 
In 1954 90% of the department heads and upper level leaders in the ministry 
were party members. Although the differences between ministry and enter-
prises as regards origin and education leveled out in comparison with the late 
40s, they remained considerable nonetheless. 49% of top ministry officials 
originated from working class and 5.6% from the peasantry as against 73.5% 
and 7.5% among enterprise managers. This also means that nearly half of the 
ministry cadres came from intellectual, clerical worker, or middle class families 
as opposed to one-fifth of firm managers. Similarly, while only 5.3% of high-
ranking ministerial officials had not completed eight years of elementary 
school, 22.4% of enterprise managers belonged to this category and had taken 
courses in adult education.  
Between 1953 and 1956 the press struck a more critical tone about managers 
than technicians.22 Although the greater part of these writings was concerned 
with the new type of leaders supporting socialist emulation, they analyzed the 
cases of imprisoned new directors as well. Some also enlarged upon the direc-
tors increased responsibility and the deficiencies of excessive centralization of 
industry. Underlying this writings was a resolution by the Council of Ministers 
(No. 1073/1954/IV.9.) specifying the duties of the directors of industrial enter-
prises which declared that there were phenomena both in legal regulation and 
in practice that “curbed the authority of the director, reduced his inventiveness 
and express unjustified mistrust. Most conspicuous are the excessive centraliza-
                                                                                                                                
tudományos megalapozását szolgáló kutatások. (Comparing the careers of various cohorts 
of economists. Researhes to provide the scientific basis for a youth policy.) No. 7. Informa-
tional Bulletin. Bp. 1985. p. 67.; Mária M.Kovács-Antal Örkény: Promoted cadres and pro-
fessionals in post-war Hungary, in: Rudolf Andorka-László Bertalan (eds.): Economy and 
Society in Hungary. Bp. 1986. pp. 139-153. 
20  Pártunk kádermunkájának tapasztalatai és irányelvei. Tézisek (l962. febr.) (Experiences and 
guidelines of our party`s cadre work (Theses. Febr.1962.)) in: A Magyar Szocialista Mun-
káspárt határozatai és dokumentumai 1956-1962. (Resolutions and Documents of the Hun-
garian Socialist Workers` Party) 1973. p. 537.  
21  New Hungarian Central Archives (NHCA) Ministry of Metallurgy and Machine Industry 
(MMMI) XIX-F-6. Leadership session 1955., 14.1.d. Report of Personnel Division on the 
cadre work of the MMMI. p. 5.  
22  Sz. N. Apr. 5., 1953. p. 1.; Febr. 15., 1954. p. 1. 
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tion of matters, the measure of intervention bypassing the director, the manifes-
tations of bureaucracy and functionalism”.23 
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1953 3 5 56 13 7  - 16 - 87 
1972 4 7 45 24 7  2 11 - 63 
Great Britain+ 
1989 - - 29 26 -  6 39 - 50 
1953+ 21 3 44 21 3  5 3 - 71 
1964* 15 - 36 18 5 17  3 5 2 118 
1972+ 18 3 32 30 3  10 5  51 
Germany 
1989+ 6 - 44 22 -  22 6  51 
1953 26 6 44 16 -  4 4  77 
1972 4 2 58 27 4  2 2  55 
France+ 
1989 16 4 33 29 4  5 9  57 
1955++    9    20 49 6 39 
1955++    2    8 74 8 60 
1962**    33 8   14 39 6 36 
1962***    6    3 88 3 33 
1984#    22 3 9 54 10 68 
Hungary 
1984## - - - 14 2 19 45 16 2845 
Table 1: Social origin of the British, French, German and Hungarian  
economic elite (1953-1989) (%) 
+  Source: Youssef Cassis (1997) Big Business. The European Experience in 
the Twentieth Century. Oxford U.P., Oxford, p. 124.  
*  Source: Hartmut Kaelble, (1980) Long-term Changes in the Recruitment 
of the Business Elite: Germany Compared to the US, Great Britain, ,and 
France Since the Industrial Revolution. Journal of Social History no. 3. pp. 
404-423. 
                                                             
23  Hatályos jogszabályok gyüjteménye 1945-1958. (Collection of Valid Legal Rules) Bp. 
1960. Vol. I. p. 675. 
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++  Source: Report on the cadres of Ministry of Metallurgy and Machine In-
dustry, 1955, UMKL KGM XIX-F-6 (heads of main departments, their 
deputies, and heads of departments, w/o the 16% “other” category). 
+++ Source: Report on the cadres of Ministry of Metallurgy and Machine 
Industry, 1955, UMKL KGM XIX-F-6 (company directors w/o the 8% 
“other” category). 
**  Source: Report on the cadres of Ministry of Heavy Industry, Branch of 
Mining, 1962, UMKL XIX-F-17-b (heads of main departments, their de-
puties, and heads of departments). 
***  Source: Report on the cadres of Ministry of Heavy Industry, Branch of 
Mining, 1962, UMKL XIX-F-17-b. (company directors). 
#  Source: Statistical data on the state and co-operative leaders, 1984. Bp. 
1985, p. 44 (deputy ministers, state secretaries, w/o 2% “other” category). 
##  Source: Statistical data on the state and co-operative leaders, 1984. Bp. 
1985, p. 44 (directors of state enterprises, trusts, conglomerates and joint 
stock companies, w/o 4% “other” category). 
 
The resolution vested the director with individual responsibility. Though the 
introductory clause of the resolution stated that the reasons for its enactment 
were excessive centralization and the spread of bureaucracy, its detailed dis-
cussion reveals that the individual responsibility of the director meant respon-
sibility to comply with the directives, which was consistent with Soviet prac-
tice. Besides conforming to the methodical directives, the director was respon-
sible for the detailed plan of the firm, the fulfillment of the approved plan, the 
rational utilization of the funds allocated by the central control institutions, the 
working out of the firm’s list of profiles and their approval. It was, however, a 
novelty that the criticism of bureaucracy was extended to the intermediate level 
control institutions, that the high number of plan indicators was criticized and 
the demand for a professional economic approach was stressed. Another nov-
elty, following the XXth Soviet party congress and the resolution of the Hun-
garian communist party, was the principle adopted by the ministries in summer 
1956 that “people should cease to be afraid of the personnel department staff”24. 
After 1956 the criteria of loyalty and competence were reshuffled: social 
origin lost and political activity gained importance in determining loyalty. The 
latter is born out by a 1957 resolution of the HSWP’s CC which provided for 
the old, neglected cadres of the labor movement, proposing that “ministries and 
government agencies should survey all the areas where reliability is decisive so 
that the veterans of the labor movement can be stationed on these posts. The 
line of the councils must be reinforced with the old comrades”.25 Part of the 
control mechanisms of political reliability whose weight had increased was a 
                                                             
24  NHCA MMMI XIX-F-6. Leadership sessions, 1956. July 26. 
25  Resolutions and Documents of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, 1956-1962. Bp. 
1973. p. 149. 
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government decree No. 1050/57 (V. 31.) on the setting up of personnel depart-
ments. It established that “apart from its several positive features, the former 
system of personnel control was unable to safeguard the state apparatus from 
the unreliable elements due to over-centralization, ensuing cumbersomeness 
and superficial methods of evaluation”.26 
It set as the main duty of a personnel department to supervise the reliability 
and professional competence of leaders giving preference, besides “workers, 
working peasants and loyal-to-democracy intellectuals” (note the epithets that 
pointed at selection criteria in the given context), to the politically committed 
sons and daughters of the new intelligentsia. It regarded the political role 
played in 1956 as an important aspect of judgment but stressed also that be-
yond this point personal performance must be the basis of evaluation and that 
the person concerned must be shown the records of evaluation. 
Similar was the effect of law-decree No. 66 by the Presidential Council fix-
ing the spheres of activities to be filled by people with certificates of probity or 
good conduct.27 In the first half of 1957 2060 people belonging to the jurisdic-
tion of Ministry of Metallurgy od Machine Industry (MMMI) had to obtain 
certificates of good conduct but only 69 were not issued one and in 30 cases the 
firms applied for exemptions.28 Thus there were comparatively few people in 
these jobs who could be declared unsuitable on political grounds. A far graver 
social problem was posed by those workers who had been dismissed for their 
political conduct and whose re-employment became so difficult that already in 
November 1957 the labor minister was forced to intervene. In his communica-
tion to the minister of heavy industry the minister stated that “enterprises are 
afraid to employ such workers and are reluctant to hire them even for lower-
grade work”.29 This however, hindered the “re-education” of these workers, 
jeopardized law and order, and prevented the enforcement of the right to work, 
the minister reasoned. 
The implementation of decree No. 66 dragged on into the early 60s; until 
1960, for example, there were 7666 petitions submitted to the MMMI and only 
in 265 cases were the persons concerned forbidden to fill an important or con-
fidential position.30 By then the decree had already been criticized because its 
interpretation of reliability was too narrow. On the other hand, the party resolu-
tion of 1957 declared that non-party people could also fill leading posts except-
ing party functions. If, they claimed, “we prescribe party membership as a pre-
requisite of any leading position we incur the danger that careerist elements 
might infiltrate our party, and on the other side, professionally highly qualified, 
                                                             
26  Collection of Valid Legal Rules, 1945-1958. Bp. 1960. Vol. II. p. 752. 
27  Ibid. Vol. I. pp. 352-353.  
28  NHCA MMMI XIX-F-6. 13. d. Report on the state of the personnel apparatus of the 
MMMI and the questions of personnel work. 
29  NHCA Ministry of Heavy industry (MHI) XIX-F-17. b. 7. d. 
30  NHCA MMMI XIX-F-6. Memorandum on the experiences of personnel work in 1961. 
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honest, democratic-minded people will be relegated to the background unde-
servedly”.31 In keeping with these resolutions, the ministries registered the rate 
of non-party people at top-level posts. The MMMI’s report of 1961, quoted 
above, found that 38% of chief engineers and 50% of head accountants of 
enterprises were not party members. It is also revealed that 90% of the person-
nel department staff came from worker and peasant families, 75% of them 
having an education of eight elementary grades or less. This was again a source 
of tensions that the people in the apparatus set up to check competence was far 
less educated then the economic managers they were supposed to control. 
In 1962 a report on the heavy industry disclosed a similar situation in min-
ing.32 In this branch more than two-thirds of personnel managers had primary 
education up to eight grade or less, all were of worker or peasant origin and all 
started their careers as workers. Of the division and department heads of the 
ministry two-thirds were party members, and the same percentage had higher 
education; over two-thirds had started their careers as intellectuals and clerical 
workers, and about half of them came from such a family background.  
Although a slight drop in the number of party members can be observed, the 
data exemplify that the social composition of the leaders did not change con-
siderably from the late 1940s to the early 1960s. However at the same time the 
distribution of leaders by age did change considerably: the average age rose 
from 40 to 46; while in 1949 over half of the leaders were below 40, in 1962 
only one-third of them were in this age bracket. The party document of 1962 
referred to the disapproval quoted above that in 1954 over half of the members 
of the central party apparatus were below 30 and in 1956 three-fourths of the 
entire party apparatus were below 35.33 This reveals that there must have been 
an informal selection principle favoring seniority age34 and implying a shift 
towards criteria of competence. This entailed the consideration that apart from 
formal qualifications, the time spent in the professional field was of impor-
tance, with experience coming at the prize of age. 
                                                             
31  HSWP CC Politbureau resolution on the duties of the party organization in organizing the 
economic work (July 30., 1957.) in: Resolutions and Documents of the HSWP, 1956-1962. 
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and guidelines of our party’s cadre work. Theses. Febr. 1962.) in: Resolutions and Docu-
ments of the HSWP, 1956-1962. Bp. 1973., p. 537. 
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Career Patterns and Education 
The presumptions of “planned mobility” and “cadrification” were sharply 
confronted with the values of the primer social groups in the early phase of 
planned economy. This confirmation strengthened the traditionally negative 
connotations of ‘career’.35 Even in a recent study concerning young economists 
and engineers we met the phenomenon of aversion to the notion of careers.36 In 
these cases, however, the reasons for refusal or dislike differed greatly from 
those of the 50s. These young intellectuals were not discriminated against or 
were not blocked in their advancement because of their class origin. A part of 
them felt that the old, non-educated cadres blocked their ways. Another part 
just felt that their leaders worked too hard for relatively moderate pay and with 
too much risk of failure. 
Case studies suggested that economic managers in Hungary saw themselves 
as falling into two characteristic career types: that of “paratrooper” and that of 
“one of us”. Although in sociological terms these are certainly crude catego-
ries, they conform to real phenomena.37 The first is closest to that which is 
described by sociologists as a political career pattern. Interestingly enough, 
however, researchers agree that it is by no means the most frequent type. “Para-
troopers” have to face resistance in their enterprises, especially from white 
collar workers and they have to counterbalance the resistance with networking 
skills they acquired through social and political dealings. The second type 
resembles the continuous professional career pattern, although – as we shall see 
– in certain cases the professional characteristics are only illusive. 
A comparative study based on a small sample-survey contributes additional 
elements to the picture.38 This research into enterprise leaders of four countries 
(Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria) has revealed that the majority 
of economic leaders in the 1980s were male party members over 40, a consid-
erable part of them with higher education, mostly in technical fields. It appears 
to be a common feature of all career patterns that the majority of leaders ob-
tained a managerial office – normally at middle level – already before 30. This 
also implies that out of the four – managerial, professional, political and admin-
istrative – career patterns the first (or rather the combination of the first two) is 
predominant, with significant variations by countries. There are, however, great 
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differences in this regard between the age-groups as well: the career patterns 
other than managerial-professional have a great role in the older generations, 
the administrative being overrepresented in Hungary and the political in the 
other three countries. 
According to an attempt at typologization by H. Najduchowska39 nearly 
one-third of Polish managers had professional technical careers inside enter-
prises. Her study found also a positive correlation between the rates of profes-
sional-managerial careers and the size of the enterprises. Research has docu-
mented a definite shift from technical to economic and social science graduates 
among highly qualified managers, an indication of the increasing significance 
of the administrative career pattern. 
The numerical importance of economic leaders with a purely political career 
is low, yet its weight is greatly enhanced by the fact that political affiliation is 
an immanent part of the managerial role. This is maybe one reason why, ac-
cording to the research findings of M. Kostecki40 in 1974, 78% of leaders in the 
studied area (Polish chemical industry, where a mere 1% had ‘political’ ca-
reers) were party members, eight times as much as among the active popula-
tion. One may add that besides their professional work some 60% of the man-
agers filled one or more party posts in the party organizations of the enterprise, 
town or district during their careers. The situation described above is confirmed 
and further elaborated by the researches of J. Wasilewki.41 
Following a critical revision of the relevant literature he distinguished two 
main groups of career patterns, continual and “hopscotch” careers. The young 
leaders below 40 whom he at first studied were dominated by continual admin-
istrative and technical careers or their mixed types. “Hopscotch” careers 
amounting to one-third included, in addition to a significant rate of political 
and managerial career patterns, a kind of expert careers based on the converti-
bility of research knowledge and skills. Comparing data on intra- and intergen-
erational mobility one can find that “hopscotch” careers are frequently induced 
by regional and interregional mobility. However, while among leaders with 
political careers those with an Eastern regional and peasant background were 
overrepresented, the intellectual background was dominant among leaders who 
passed through regionally equally mobile managerial and expert careers. This 
also applies to technical leaders born mostly in the capital. The young manag-
ers as a group are found to be politically active from an early time (some three-
fourths of them from the very first job their held), and this seems to be espe-
                                                             
39  Halina Najduchowska: Drogi zawodowe kadry kierowniczej. (Professional trajectories of 
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cially significant among leaders with “hopscotch” careers both of political and 
managerial type.  
Certain observations indicate that in the 1980s in the case of the managerial 
group political opposition had less impact on professional careers, than for 
administrative and party leaders in the ‘80s. While 25% of the managers were 
members of the legal Solidarity, there are virtually no members in the other two 
groups of the regional elite. One may conclude from this fact that in the case of 
the economic leaders the education had primary and the political loyalty to-
wards the communist regime had secondary importance, while in the case of 
the other two groups the emphasis was reversed. However, these differences 
are usually gradual and not antagonistic.  
The contradictory situation of the economic leaders was mostly a result of 
the fact that they were cadres and managers at the same time. Education, ex-
perience and party membership were more or less equally important in the 
formal and informal social processes of their selection.   
Table 2: Tertiary education among the members of the he British, French, 
German and Hungarian economic elite (1950-1989) (%) 
 1950-1953 1962-1972 1984-1989 
Great Britain# 57 69 83 
France# 98 96 97 
Germany# 78 86 100 
Hungary    22*      45**        91*** 
 
#  Source: Youssef Cassis (1997) Big Business. The European Experience in 
the Twentieth Century. Oxford U.P., Oxford, p. 133. 
*  Source: Report on the leaders of the Ministry of Light Industry, 1950 Dec. 
21.P.I.A. 276f. 90/193 (heads of main departments, their deputies, and 
heads of departments). 
**  Source: Report on the cadres of Ministry of Heavy Industry, Branch of 
Mining, 1962, UMKL XIX-F-17-b (heads of main departments, their de-
puties, and heads of departments, company directors). 
***  Source: Statistical data on the state and co-operative leaders, 1984. Bp. 
1985, p 44 (directors of state enterprises, trusts, conglomerates and joint 
stock companies, 1984. Bp. 1985, p. 63). 
 
A study of the top level leaders of Hungarian enterprises and cooperatives 
reveals that the rate of leaders above the age of 50 rose from 22% to 44% be-
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tween 1960 and l980.42 However, the cadre changes which were partly started 
for the purpose of rejuvenation and which gained momentum in the early 
1980s, did not automatically imply a rise in the level of education: the share of 
leaders without higher education was firmly reproduced in the younger co-
horts.43 This important finding refers to the fact that the “one of us”-effect was 
a special type of local political career pattern. On the other hand, there appears 
to be a close correlation between the long term rise in educational level and the 
size and type of managerial position: while 86% of the leaders of larger enter-
prises were graduates, only 32% of 3rd category cooperative leaders had an 
equal amount of higher education. The two outer extremes in this respect were 
technical and economic deputy managers, 16% of the former and 36% of the 
latter being not academically qualified. This incongruence was even higher 
among the head accountants of cooperatives.44 
In Czechoslovakia in the early 1960s over 70% of the leaders lacked the 
level of education required by their jobs.45 There appears to be a positive corre-
lation between incongruence and hierarchical position, and although the pro-
portion of leaders without adequate training was considerably reduced over the 
subsequent decades, the rate of economic leaders with top-level education was 
only 43% as late as the early 1980s. But newly industrializing areas faced with 
more difficulties seemed to be more open to the recruitment of more highly 
qualified leaders.  
The Impacts of the Economic Reform 
The most important outcome of the first wave of the Hungarian economic 
reform in 1968 was that it put an end to the system of the compulsory plan 
directions in economic and legal terms. The strategic decisions concerning 
investment and business policy came under the jurisdiction of corporations and 
in this respect they became formally independent units again. Paradoxically, 
while the formally dependent enterprises had a certain amount of informal 
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45  Lenka Kalinova: Az irányitási és a müszaki dolgozók foglalkozási és szakképzettségi 
strukturájának változásai Csehszlovákiában. (Changes in the occupational structure of con-
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81-123. 
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maneuvering previously, after the reform the importance of the informal pres-
sures of the party and state organizations has rapidly increased. Although it is 
hard to verify with the tools of empirical research46, the institution of vertical 
informalism remained an important factor of real processes.  
The casual interventions, the pressures of the party and state organizations 
together with the external market processes created an uncertain and inconsis-
tent economic environment for the enterprises. In this inconsistent environment 
a large part of the economic leaders were not able to form a consistent strategy. 
They tended to characterize themselves neither as generalists nor as specialists 
but as “firemen”, whose main task was to fulfill the last request or solve the 
most urgent problem.47 
On the other hand the informalism was invariably a tool of the extortion of 
concessions.48 There were influential leaders of large enterprises who were 
interested in continuing the policy of “exceptional cases”, while the majority of 
the managers were interested in the creation of homogenous rules, which was 
taught to be a prerequisite for a successful economic transformation.49 
Although an account of vertical informalism has been derived mainly from 
interviews, horizontal informalism – which is close to the “clique friendship” 
concept of anthropology – has been described by representative research as 
well.50 E.g. leaders of agricultural enterprises found these forms of communica-
tion and assistance to be widely used, legitimate and helpful to their work. 
In the first half of the 1980s there were significant changes in the methods 
of selection of Hungarian enterprise managers. One innovation was the intro-
duction of competition, which apparently was operationalized by scrutinizing 
job applicants’ past practice, technical professional competence and knowledge 
of the enterprise.51 The competitive system greatly expanded the number of 
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applicants for managerial positions and even of their judges. But according to 
the experiences, the number of candidates with a really good chance remained 
very low. 
Another development affecting the composition of the managerial stratum 
was the introduction of new forms of enterprise management after the amend-
ment of the Enterprise Act in l984. This also modified the institutional condi-
tions of the competition system. Enterprise councils were set up in the majority 
of firms (a small number of firms operated in the form of a general assembly or 
assembly of delegates, while another small number remained under central 
control). It was the duty of the enterprise council to determine the firm’s strat-
egy, including the appointment of the manager, – a responsibility which for-
merly belonged to the authority of the relevant ministry. Later the original 
rights of the enterprise council have been restricted again in accordance with 
the needs of transformation and privatization. These developments certainly 
modified the hierarchical relations within a firm and reformed the relations 
between firms and central economic control. But data have shown that from the 
very beginning four-fifth of enterprise council members have belonged to the 
staff or middle-management.52 Although in the meantime the importance of the 
enterprise councils has declined, the institutional changes have reinforced the 
position of the technocrats who have played a great role in preserving the sta-
bility of the firms.53 
Changing of the System and the New Elite in the Making 
By the end of the ,80s the formerly ideologically homogeneous elite became 
segmented. This segmentation was described among others by Erzsébet Szalai 
as the disintegration of the coalition between the party-based old elite and the 
technocratic new elite.54 It was also a generational feature since the majority of 
the new elite was recruited from members of the beat generation who priced 
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highest competence, liberalism, meritocracy, but lacked a relevant social sensi-
bility. 
Taking the above-said as a hypothesis, I am going to examine, on the basis 
of the findings of an empirical investigation carried out in spring 1990, the 
specificities of the new elite in terms of social composition.55 
In the second half of the 1980s the economic elite, first of all the financial 
leaders, was indeed substantially rejuvenated. Especially spectacular was the 
change in the former group: a more detailed subdivision reveals a striking 
difference in the age composition of the bankers and the other two groups. 
While only 30% of ministry and enterprise leaders were under 45, the leaders 
of the reviving banking sphere were much younger with some 60% of them 
belonging to this age group. Leaders under 35 were four times as many among 
bankers as the average of the elite. 
In 1990 83% of the economic elite were male. That means that the share of 
female leaders had somewhat risen over the past 5 years, yet the economic 
leadership is still predominantly a male role.56 
Higher education graduates had an overwhelming majority with 95%. The 
former party members form a group of similar importance, showing analogous 
numbers.  
By 1990, however, party membership had lost its key role in screening peo-
ple, which it had performed when proving loyalty. Despite some well-known 
examples, the economic elite refused to get involved in party politics through 
personal membership. A great part of former party members left the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party in 1989, some did so even earlier, and they did not 
look for a new party. Thus prior to the 1990 elections, about 1/8th of the eco-
nomic elite comprised those who changed over to the Hungarian Socialist Party 
rallying the reformist fraction of the previously ruling party. At the same time 
just over 1% joined the pro-socialist Workers, Party. A conspicuously low 1% 
joined the parties of the election winner centre-right coalition: the Hungarian 
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Democratic Forum, the Christian Democratic Party and the Smallholders, 
Party. The members joining the parties constituting the democratic opposition 
amount to 1% of the economic elite. All this does not mean that the members 
of the economic elite resign from the informal political channels of asserting 
their interests, and that there are no positions that imply strict political loyalty. 
It merely implies that party membership and political activity do not necessar-
ily designate the basis of recruitment for an economic elite57. 
With regard to social composition gauged by the fathers’, occupation, the 
elite could still be considered open at the beginning of the ‘90s: about half of 
them originate from workers families and some 30% from an intellectual or 
elite background. It is conspicuous that the group of enterprise managers sig-
nificantly differed from those of the economic policy-markers and bank man-
agers, regarding the proportion of those with an intellectual or elite family 
background. While in the former their rate was one-fourth, in the latter two it 
was one-third and 45%, respectively. Especially the rate of scions of leaders 
among bankers was (17%). This was probably related to the age composition of 
this group and the relatively high rate of young leaders. A similar tendency can 
be registered with regard to the education of the parents. The fathers of one-
fifth of enterprise leaders had higher education, while the corresponding rate 
was one-third among ministry leaders and 44% among bank managers. As for 
the mother’s schooling, 3% had higher education in the group of enterprise 
leaders, while only amounting to 12% in the group of ministry heads, and 22% 
in the bankers’ group. 
The amount of members whose fathers had a higher education diploma had 
a proportion of one-sixth among managers, and one-third among presidents and 
general directors, as well as department and division heads. The mothers’ edu-
cation outlines a similar tendency: one-sixth of the managers and one-third of 
the other two groups had mothers with secondary or higher education. 
Our data suggest that there was greater deviation between the segments of 
the elite than between levels and positions of leadership. The offspring of 
white-collars were rarer among enterprise managers than among bankers and 
ministry leaders, and so were those whose mother was not a housewife. The 
fathers of 47% of enterprise managers had finished primary schooling or some 
primary classes only. The corresponding figures were 35% for bankers and 
39% for ministry leaders. There were even more tightly-knit correlations in the 
case of the mothers: the mothers of 78% of enterprise managers, 48% of bank-
ers and 60% of ministry leaders had finished 8 primary classes or less. The 
mother’s position as to schooling and occupation had a closer correlation with 
the segmentation of the elite than the father’s. Nevertheless, it applies to both 
parents that origin correlated more closely to the segmentation of leadership 
than to hierarchic stratification. 
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All this indicates that the economic institutions differ in the mechanisms of 
social selection. The levels of leadership do not tally despite all formal coinci-
dences: though formally representing identical levels of leadership, enterprise 
leaders, bank managers and ministry leaders have different social backgrounds. 
But as shown above, the correlation between recruitment and the segments 
of the elite is not independent of the generational distribution. A look at the age 
groups reveals that 61% of leaders aged 44 or under had a middle class father 
(the corresponding rates for bankers and ministry leaders are over three-
quarters and 70%, respectively). An examination of leaders in the age bracket 
of 45 years and over, reveals that 47% of the fathers belonged to the above 
category and there was a negligible difference between the segments. This is 
confirmed by the fact that the Gamma index of the correlation between the 
segments and origin was 0.42 for the younger generation and 0.07 for older 
leaders. Half of the mothers worked and half were housewives. Comparing the 
worker-housewife distribution of mothers to their level of education, shows 
that while about two-thirds of mothers finished up to 8 elementary classes , this 
proportion was 85% among housewives (50% of them finished 6 classes at 
most). Instead of a middle-class family model, the category of the housewife 
mother represents a lower status, i.e. a more traditional model. Our data clearly 
show that the rate of housewife mothers was far lower (35%) among the 
younger leaders than in the older age group (58%). The generational effect 
reinforced again the differences between the segments, consequently the pro-
portion of housewife mothers was lower among younger bankers and ministry 
leaders than the age-group average. 
There was an especially strong generational difference in regard to the par-
ents’, schooling. As against one-fourth of younger leaders, over half of the 
older leaders had fathers with primary schooling only. The same applied to the 
mothers, education, with the corresponding figures being 54% for younger 
leaders and three-fourths for older ones. Segments varied more widely concern-
ing the schooling of the parents of younger leaders than in the older age group. 
Especially marked was the deviation between the segments in regard to the 
schooling of the mothers of the younger leaders (Gamma = 0.6). More than 
two-thirds of the young enterprise leaders are part of families where the 
mother’s schooling did not exceed the eight primary classes, whereas among 
young bankers and ministry leaders the corresponding rates were a mere one-
sixth or one-seventh. 
A similar tendency is demonstrated by the correlation of position and social 
background by age. Among younger leaders the background variables and 
position correlate more closely than in the older age group. Among those born 
after the war there is a more pronounced differentiation as to both segments 
and positions than among those born before the war. At the same time all indi-
cations reveal that position shows a weaker correlation with origin than with 
institutional segments. The mother’s occupation and education correlates more 
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closely with position than the father’s (the latter being negligible in the older 
age group). 
Trying to summarize the generational effect, one comes to the conclusion 
that the new generation of leaders tended to be closer to each other already 
before the changing of the system. Furthermore the differences in recruitment 
were larger between the segments of younger leaders than in the older genera-
tion. The younger generations of the elite were increasingly more closed so-
cially and more markedly segmented. 
Regarding career patterns it is conspicuous that the great majority – about 
three quarters – of the economic elite of the ‘80s had a continuous career. Ad-
ministrative careers predominated the continuous careers (characterizing nearly 
half of the elite), with a quarter having a hopscotch career and another quarter 
running a technical or technical-administrative course. As a matter of course, 
administrative careers principally characterized ministries and banks and tech-
nical careers were typical of enterprises. While distributed rather evenly among 
the segments, hopscotch careers were slightly underrepresented in the banking 
sphere. 
Comparatively small is the rate of the hopscotch careers which subdivide 
into experts, politicians, manager’s and “big leap” career types. The “big leap” 
type of career characterizes those who began as workers and taking one “big 
initial leap”, they became leaders58. According to this subdivision, the experts’ 
and politicians’ careers were somewhat overrepresented in the ministries, as 
were the managers’ careers in enterprises. 
The “big leap” type occurs less frequently in the banking sphere than in the 
other two segments. It was disproved that the manager’s and expert’s careers 
presupposed a family background of higher social status, and the political and 
“big leap” careers rooted in a family background of lower status. The rate of 
working family offspring was somewhat higher than average among those who 
had a manager’s or politician’s career, while this rate was slightly below aver-
age in the “big leap” career type. This suggests that the initial big leap does not 
imply the survival of the traditional worker-turned-director type. Instead, in 
most cases it indicates the few years before higher education and the usually 
continuous careers after graduation. Administrative careers were typical of 
most of the younger elite group, while in the older generation the technical 
career was more frequent than average. Another assumption that was not con-
firmed claimed that the political career pattern decreased in the younger group. 
Political careers had a very low share totaling a mere 6%, with a somewhat 
higher rate in the younger group. 
It cannot be declared that the intra-institutional career pattern characterized 
leaders in the younger age group or those in lower positions. The latter correla-
tion was further weakened by the fact that heads of divisions and departments 
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were only included in the ministry sub-sample where the local career pattern 
had a smaller weight. Among the newly appointed there was a below-average 
rate of those who had risen within the same institution59. 
The fluctuation of leaders widely differed in the three segments of the econ-
omy. While 42% of enterprise leaders had been in their current position for 
over 5 years, 44% of the bank leaders and 54% of the ministry elite had been in 
their new posts for one year. This affected the career patterns in sofar as the 
administrative career was overrepresented among the newly appointed and the 
hopscotch and technical careers were more frequent among those who had been 
in their current positions for a longer period of time. Over half the leaders 
below 44 had been in their new posts for just a year or less, with only one-sixth 
having been in office for over 5 years. The proportion of the latter was over 
one-third in the older group. The investigation did not establish that the rate of 
hopscotch careers decreased going down the hierarchy. There was a relatively 
stable one-fourth rate for hopscotch careers in various positions. 
Segments also differed as to career pattern type in that, taking all the previ-
ous stations of career into account, inter-segment mobility was chiefly typical 
of ministry leaders, intra-segment fluctuation characterized bankers and intra-
institutional career was most frequent among enterprise leaders. 
Administrative careers had a greater share among the vertically mobile lead-
ers (those rising in inter-segment mobility), but the political careers among 
them did not exceed the average of 6%. All this derives from the different 
specificities of the two dominant groups of economist and engineers. While 
nearly two-thirds of the incumbents for one year or less were economists, the 
same proportion characterized the engineers among those in office for five 
years. Hence, economists were overrepresented among younger leaders and 
engineers among older ones. 
While economists were overrepresented in the inter- and intra-segment ca-
reer types, engineers had an above-average rate in the intra-institutional career 
type (careers in one enterprise). 
The fluctuation of the Hungarian economic elite largely increased prior to 
the changing of the political system. In 1990, before the elections, the propor-
tion of economic leaders for a year at new posts was nearly 40%. In the early 
1980s the corresponding rate was one-fourth. As against the earlier 45% of lead-
ers in position for three years at most, their proportion in 1990 was over 60%. 
There was an especially vigorous fluctuation in the ministries where three-
quarters of the leaders had changed within three years, half of these leaders 
within one year. The same can be observerd with banks, where the rate of lead-
ers appointed within three years was four-fifth, with 45% of them being in 
office for a year. Due to institutional changes, this growth is especially large in 
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the banking sphere because in the first half of the 1980s there was a below-
average fluctuation in this segment, and now it was found to be the highest. 
Thus the changing of the Hungarian economic elite began before the chang-
ing of the system. Was this newly risen elite really new? As the above survey 
reveals, it contained new features regarding its social profile. It was a younger, 
more closed social formation recruited from groups of higher social prestige 
than the former elite was. Yet it also displayed features typical of the previous 
economic leadership. It continued to be predominated by males, higher educa-
tion graduates and former party members. A look at the pre-appointment work-
place of the elite reveals, that more than three-quarters of those appointed a 
year before had worked for the same institution or enterprise in their previous 
position as well. 
This is connected with the preponderance of continuous, administrative ca-
reers. Yet, as was pointed out above, in earlier phases of the careers there was 
considerable inter- and intra-segment mobility. 
The changing of the economic elite thus began, but did not end before the 
political transformations. The emerging new elite was far more inclined to ap-
preciate the market experiences and the meritocratic elements in the selection 
of leaders60. 
The members of the elite would tend to increase the difference between the 
highest and lowest incomes, whereas the employees would give a rise to every-
one, decreasing at the same time the difference between the smallest and big-
gest incomes61. 
At the same time the economic leaders were – seemingly contradictorily to 
what Erzsébet Szalai said of the social insensitivity of the new elite – more 
willing than the ordinary people to adopt the view that “all the needy should be 
supported irrespective of their political ideas or origin”62. The new elite was not 
less sensitive socially than the rest of the social strata, but it has a greater social 
responsibility. 
Party membership had lost its significance, being replaced by personal rela-
tions – an important asset earlier, too – and institutional multi-positional status, 
as preconditions for managerial success. This characterizes the still predomi-
nant state elite and the leaders of the emerging private economy. One of the 
main findings of a content analysis of advertisements for managerial posts was 
that the requirements expected to be met by Hungarian private company man-
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agers were far more similar to those of state enterprises than foreign joint com-
panies63. 
The act governing share-holding companies stipulated that one person could 
not fill more than one operative managerial position. One could, however, be a 
member of the supervisory committee of up to five companies64. Party mem-
bership was no precondition, but there was a border area between economy and 
politics where a new type of leader was emerging: that of the “economic pol-
icy” entrepreneurs. He was an entrepreneur, a leader in the reviving employers, 
interest-protecting organizations, as well as in legislation or lobbying. These 
roles mutually generate and reinforce each other. This career pattern character-
izes most of the successful intellectual-entrepreneurs65. Interviews and surveys 
of private entrepreneurs suggest that the entrepreneurs themselves regard the 
establishment of personal contacts as one of the tokens of success 66. 
Conclusions 
Surveying the long term changes of recruitment and career patterns of eco-
nomic leaders in the East European planned economies we could reconstruct 
the outlines of a slow and contradictory professionalization. 
The criteria of recruitment have shifted from class origin to education, ex-
perience and party membership. The original differences between the leaders of 
the control sphere and the managers have decreased but have not disappeared. 
The basis of recruitment in the case of the new generation of economic leaders 
was relatively wide as far as their social origin was concerned. But if the party 
membership and education are taken into account, it was extremely narrow, as 
a result of cadrification and professionalization. 
With the changing of the system, party membership gave way to compe-
tence and networks as the basic criteria of recruitment. As regards its social 
profile, a new economic elite is in the making. The members constituting its 
greater part have arrived from the second line, sharing the workplace experi-
ences and career patterns with their retired predecessors. With the systemic 
changes, privatization and the spread of entrepreneurial forms, alternative 
career patterns have appeared outside of large organizations. In 1988, 25% of 
the adult population of Hungary showed interest in becoming entrepreneurs. In 
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1990 their proportion was as high as 44%. Potential entrepreneurs were clearly 
overrepresented among young intellectuals and skilled workers. While the big 
challenge of the economic reform was to assign managerial traits to the cadres, 
the social effect of the changing of the system can be captured in the fact that it 
pits the entrepreneurial alternative against state enterprise managers. The roles, 
however, were not yet clear, the behavioral patterns had not struck firm roots in 
the early ‘90s. 
